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1 Introduction
A cooperative game (transferable utility game) is specified by two factors, a set of players
and a characteristic function which assigns a real number to each coalition (subset of the
player set). A main problem in a TU-game is to fix an allocation rule (solution) such that
the players may redistribute the utilities among themselves.
In order to deal with partial participation of players in a coalition, the concept of fuzzy
coalitions was introduced by Aubin [1]. Some developments of cooperative fuzzy games
can be seen in Nishizaki and Sakawa [7] and Br\^anzei [3]. If we regard an ordinary coalition
as a vertex of the hypercube $[0,1]^{n}$ , i.e., a point in $\{0,1\}^{n}$ ( $n$ is the number of players),
a fuzzy coalition is a point in the hypercube $[0,1]^{n}$ . Thus the domain of a characteristic
function in a cooperative fuzzy game is $[0,1]^{n}$ , while that in an ordinary cooperative game
is $\{0,1\}^{n}$ .
In this paper we consider special classes of cooperative fuzzy games which are obtained
as extensions of ordinary cooperative games. These classes include the multilinear exten-
sions and the Lov\’asz extensions. Several properties such as superadditivity and convexity
of these classes of games will be investigated. We also discuss solutions for fuzzy games
obtained as extensions of ordinary games in terms of the concept of dividends, which are
coefficients in representation of ordinary games as linear combinations of the unanimity
games.
2 Cooperative Games
A transferable utility game (cooperative game) $(N,v)$ or simply $v$ consists of two factors:
a set of players $N=\{1,2, \ldots,n\}$ and a characteristic function $v$ : $2^{N}arrow R$ such that
$v(\emptyset)=0$ . A subset $S\subseteq N$ is usually called a coalition and $v(S)$ is called the worth of $S$ .
We denote by $\Gamma^{N}$ the set of all TU-games on $N$ .
Deflnition 1 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is said to be
1. monotonic if
$v(S)\leq v(T),$ $\forall S,$ $T\subseteq N,$ $s.t$ . $S\subseteq T$.
2. superadditive if
$v(S\cup T)\geq v(S)+v(T),$ $\forall S,$ $T\subseteq N,$ $s.t$ . $S\cap T=\emptyset$ .
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3. convex if
$v(S\cup T)+v(S\cap T)\geq v(S)+v(T),$ $\forall S,$ $T\subseteq N$ .
In other words, the game $(N,v)$ is convex if and only if the set function $v$ is super-
modular (The terminology “supermodular” is used in discrete convex analysis).
The sum of two games $v,$ $w\in\Gamma^{N}$ , and the scalar multiplication of $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ by $\alpha\in R$
are defined as follows:
$(v+w)(S)=v(S)+w(S),$ $\forall S\subseteq N$ ,
$(\alpha v)(S)=\alpha v(S)$ , $\forall S\subseteq N$ ,
Thus $\Gamma^{N}$ is a $(2^{n}-1)$-dimensional vector space.
Usually we consider unanimity games as the basis of this linear space. The unanimity
game $u\tau\in\Gamma^{N}$ for $T\subseteq N,$ $T\neq\emptyset$ , is defined by
$u_{T}(S)=\{\begin{array}{l}1, if T\subseteq S0, otherwise\end{array}$
A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ can be represented as a linear combination of the unanimity games as
$v= \sum_{T\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)u_{T}$
. Hence $v(S)= \sum_{T\subseteq S}d_{T}(v)$ . Here the coefficient
$d_{T}(v)= \sum_{S\subseteq T}(-1)^{|T|-|S|}v(S)$
is called the Harsanyi dividend. It can be also given by the following recursive formula:
$d_{T}(v)=\{$ $0v(T)- \sum_{S\subset T}d_{S}(v)$ , if $T\neq\emptyset$
if $T=\emptyset$
3 Extension of Cooperative Games : Cooperative
Fuzzy Games
An ordinary game on the player set $N$ is specified by a characteristic function $v:2^{N}arrow$
R. Here each coalition $S\subseteq N$ is identified with a vector $e^{S}\in\{0,1\}$“ through the
correspondence
$e^{S}:=\{\begin{array}{l}1, if i\in S0, otherwise.\end{array}$
Thus $v$ is a function defined on the set $\{0,1\}^{n}$ . In this section we consider an extension
of $v$ , that is a cooperative fuzzy game $\xi_{v}$ : $[0,1]^{n}arrow R$ . Of course, each extension must
satisfy the relations
$\xi_{v}(e^{S})=v(S),$ $\forall S\subseteq N$.
Cooperative fuzzy games obtained as appropriate extensions from ordinary cooperative
games form a important class of fuzzy games.
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In this paper we use the following notations. First $e^{i}=e^{\{i\}}$ . For $s,$ $t\in[0,1]^{n}$ ,
$(s \vee t)_{i}=\max\{s_{i}, t_{i}\},$ $(s \wedge t)_{i}=\min\{s_{i},t;\},$ $i=1,2,$ $\ldots,n$ .
The support of a vector $s\in[0,1]$“ is denoted by $supps=\{i\in N|s_{i}>0\}$ . We denote
by $\Delta^{N}$ the set of all cooperative fuzzy games on $N$ .
Definition 2 Cooperative fuzzy game $\xi\in\Delta^{N}$ is said to be
1. monotonic if
$\xi(s)\leq\xi(t),$ $\forall s,$ $t\in[0,1]^{n},$ $s.t$ . $s\leq t$ .
2. weakly superadditive if
$\xi(s)+\xi(t)\leq\xi(s\vee t),$ $\forall s,t\in[0,1]^{n},$ $s.t$ . $s\wedge t=0$ .
3. strongly superadditive if
$\xi(s)+\xi(t)\leq\xi(s+t),$ $\forall s,t\in[0,1]^{n},$ $s.t$ . $s+t\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
4. convex if
$\xi(s)+\xi(t)\leq\xi(s\vee t)+\xi(s\wedge t),$ $\forall s,$ $t\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
It can be easily confirmed that a strongly superadditive game is weakly superadditive
and that a convex game is weakly superadditive.
Lemma 1 Let $\xi\in\Delta^{N}$ and assume that $\xi$ is positively homogeneous, i. e., $\xi(\lambda s)=\lambda\xi(s)$
for any $\lambda>0$ and $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ such that $\lambda s\in[0,1]^{n}$ . Then $\xi$ is strongly superadditive if
and only if $\xi$ is a concave function on $[0,1]^{n}$ .
Some extensions of cooperative games have been already considered, though they have
not been necessarily regarded as cooperative fuzzy games. We consider the multilinear
extension, the Butnariu’s class and the Lov\’asz extension.
Multilinear Extensions (Owen [8])
Definition 3 The multilinear extension $m_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ of $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is defined by
$m_{v}(s)= \sum_{S\subseteq N}(\prod_{1\in S}s_{i}\prod_{i\in N\backslash S}(1-s_{i}))v(S),$
$\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
Proposition 1 Let $v,w\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $\alpha\in R$ . Then $m_{v}$ is continuous $w.r.t$ . $v$ and linear in
each component si. Moreover,
$m_{v+w}=m_{v}+m_{w},$ $m_{\alpha v}=\alpha m_{v}$ .
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Proposition 2 (Owen [8]) Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $m_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be its multilinear extension. Then
the Shapley value of the game $v$ for the player $i$ is given by
$\phi_{i}(v)=\int_{0}^{1}\frac{\partial}{\partial s_{i}}m_{v}(t, \ldots, t)dt$, $\forall i\in N$
Butnariu’s Class of Fuzzy Games
Butnariu [4] studied a class of cooperative fuzzy games, though it might not be $rearrow$
garded as an extension of ordinary cooperative games. For a vector $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ , let
$\langle s\rangle_{h}=\{i\in N I s_{i}=h\},$ $\forall h\in[0,1]$ .
Definition 4 Given a cooperative game $(N,v)$ , the cooperative fuzzy game $b_{v}\in\Delta^{N}dearrow$
fined by
$b_{v}(s)= \sum_{h\in[0,1]}v(\langle s\rangle_{h})\cdot h,$
$\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$
is called the game with proportional values.
This game is an extension of $v$ , but not continuous with respect to $v$ and therefore a
little strange.
Proposition 3 If a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is superadditive, then the fuzzy game $b_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is weakly
superadditive.
Lov\’asz Extensions
For $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ , let $0\leq h_{1}<\cdots<h_{q}$ be the components of $s$ with different values, .
$h_{0}=0$ and
$[s]_{h}=\{i\in N|s;\geq h\}$ , $h\in[0,1]$ .
Definition 5 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ . Its Lov\’asz extension $l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is defined by
$l_{v}(s)= \sum_{p=1}^{q}v([s]_{h_{p}})(h_{p}-h_{parrow 1}),$ $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
Remark 1 1) Since $[s]_{h}=[s]_{h_{p}}$ for all $h_{parrow 1}<h\leq h_{p}$ ,
$l_{v}(s)= \int_{0}^{1}v([s]_{h})dh,$ $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
Thus the Lov\’asz extension can be obtained from the original game by the Choquet integral.
Tsurumi, Tanino and Inuiguchi [11, 12] introduced, independetly of Lov\’asz, the class of
cooperative fuzzy games with Choquet integral form and discussed solution concepts, the
core function and the Shapley function.
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2$)$ If we put
$S_{p}=\{i\in N:s_{i}\geq h_{p}\}$
and
$f_{s}(S)=\{\begin{array}{ll}h_{p}-h_{p-1}, if S=S_{p}0, otherwise,\end{array}$
then,
$l_{v}(s)= \sum_{s\subseteq N}f_{s}(S)v(S)$ .
This formula is inspired by the equation
$s= \sum_{s\subseteq N}f_{s}(S)e^{S},$
$\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ ,
and adopted as the definition of the Lov\’asz extension in Bilbao $f2$].
3$)$ The Lovasz extension can be defined not only for $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ , but also for any
$s\in R_{+}^{n}$ . In this paper, however, we restnct its domain to $[0,1]^{n}$ , because we regard it as
a cooperative fuzzy game.
The Lov\’asz extension (game with Choquet integral form) is continuous with respect
to $v$ .
Proposition 4 Let $v,$ $w\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $\alpha\in$ R. Then $l_{v}$ is positively homogeneous, i.e.,
$l_{v}(\alpha s)=\alpha l_{v}(s)$ for all $\alpha\geq 0$ (when we consider the Lov\’asz extension on $R_{+}^{n}$) and
$l_{v+w}=l_{v}+l_{w},$ $l_{av}=\alpha l_{v}$ .
Theorem 1 If a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is monotonic, then its Lov\’asz extension $l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is
monotonic.
Noting that, for any $h\in[0,1]$ ,
$[s\vee t]_{h}=[s]_{h}\cup[t]_{h},$ $[s\wedge t]_{h}=[s]_{h}\cap[t]_{h}$ .
we can prove the following results.
Theorem 2 If a cooperative game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is superadditive, then its Lov\’asz extension
$l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ is weakly superadditive.
Theorem 3 If a cooperative game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is convex, then its Lovasz extension $l_{s}\in\Delta^{N}$
is a convex cooperative fuzzy game.
Proposition 5 (Bilbao, Fujishige, Murota) Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be its Lov\’asz exten-
sion. The game $v$ is convex if and only if the function $l_{v}$ is concave (on $R_{+}^{n}$).
Theorem 4 A game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ is convex if and only if its Lov\’asz extension $l_{s}$ is a strongly
superadditive cooperative fuzzy game.
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4 Extensions Based on Dividends
In this section we consider a more general extension of an ordinary cooperative game




1, if $S\supseteq T$
$0$ , otherwise$d_{T}(v)= \sum_{S\subseteq T}(-1)^{|T|-|S|}v(S)$ , and $u\tau(S)=\{$
Now let us consider an extension of the unanimity game $u_{T}\in\Gamma^{N}$ to $a_{T}\in\Delta^{N}$ . Namely
$a_{T}(e^{S})=\{\begin{array}{l}1, if S\supseteq T (i.e., if e^{S}\geq e^{T})0, otherwise\end{array}$
Then we can define an extension $\xi_{v}^{a}\in\Delta^{N}$ of $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ depending on $a$ by
$\xi_{v}^{a}(s)=\sum_{T\underline{C}N}d_{T}(v)a\tau(s),$
$\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$
It is clear that
$\xi_{u}^{a_{S}}(s)=a_{S}(s),$ $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$
Proposition 6 Let $v,w\in\Gamma^{N}$ , and $\alpha\in R$ . Then
$\xi_{v+w}^{a}=\xi_{v}^{a}+\xi_{w}^{a},$ $\xi_{\alpha v}^{a}=\alpha\xi_{v}^{a}$ .
Conversly, if the extension $v\mapsto\xi_{v}$ is linear $w.r.t$ . $v$ , it can be represented as
$\xi_{v}=\sum_{T\underline{C}N}d_{T}(v)a_{T}$
for some $a_{T}\in\Delta^{N}$ which is the extension of $u_{T}$ .
Simple examples of $a_{T}(s)$ are given as follows:
1
$\prod_{i\in T}s$
; : multilinear extension (Owen [9])
$\bullet$
$\min_{i\in T}s_{i}$ : Lov\’asz extensdion (Bilbao [2])




Theorem 6 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $l_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be its Lov\’asz extension. Then
$l_{v}(s)= \sum_{T\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)\min_{i\in T}s_{i}$ .
Other possibilities of $a_{T}$ is a t-norms in fuzzy set theory, for example,
$a_{T}(s)= \max\{0, \sum_{:\epsilon\tau}s_{i}-|T|+1\}$ .
and we may consider the extended fuzzy cooperative game
$k_{v}(s)= \sum_{T\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)\max\{0, \sum_{1\in T}s_{i}-|T|+1\}$ .
Since
$\prod_{i\in T}s_{i}\leq\min_{1\in T}s_{i}$ and $\max\{0, \sum_{i\in T}s_{i}-|T|+1\}\leq\min_{:\in T}s_{i}$ , the following holds.
Proposition 7 If $d_{T}(v)\geq 0$ for all $T\subseteq N$ , then the following relations hold:
$m_{v}(s)\leq l_{v}(s)$ , and $k_{v}(s)\leq l_{v}(s)\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
However, we should note these inequalities are not generally satisfied.
Theorem 7 If $d_{T}(v)\geq 0$ and $a_{T}(s)$ is monotnically nondecreasing for all $T\subseteq N$ in a
game $v$ , then the extension $\xi_{v}^{a}$ is a monotonic cooperative fuzzy game.
All the $a\tau(s)$ practically introduced in this paper satisfy the monotonicity, and there-
fore the extensions $m_{v},$ $l_{v}$ and $k_{v}$ are monotonic.
Lemma 2 For any $s,$ $t\in[0,1]^{n}$ and $T\subseteq N$ ,
$\prod_{:\in\tau}(s;\vee t_{i})+\prod_{\mathfrak{i}\in\tau}(s_{i}\wedge t_{i})\geq\prod_{\epsilon\tau}s_{i}+\prod_{:\epsilon\tau}t_{i}$ .
Theorem 8 If $d_{T}(v)\geq 0$ for all $T\subseteq N$ in a game $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ , then the multilinear extension
$m_{v}$ is a convex cooperative fuzzy game.
5 Solutions for U-Extensions of Ordinary Coopera-
tive Games
In this section we study solutions for cooperative fuzzy games obtained as extensions of
ordinary cooperative games.
Deflnition 6 The extension $\xi_{v}$ of $v$ is said to be $a$ U-extension of $v$ if the way of
extension is linear, $i.e_{J}$
$\xi_{v_{1}+v_{2}}=\xi_{v_{1}}+\xi_{v}2’\forall v_{1},$ $v_{2}\in\Gamma^{N}$ ,
$\xi_{\alpha w}=\alpha\xi_{w},$ $\forall w\in\Gamma^{N},\forall\alpha\in$ R.
A U-extension is said to be $a$ W-extension if for any nonempty $T\subseteq N$ ,
$\xi_{u\tau}(s)=\xi_{u\tau}(s_{|T}),$ $\forall s\in[0,1]^{n}$ ,
$\xi_{u\tau}(s)\leq\xi_{u\tau}(t),$ $\forall s,t\in[0,1]^{n}$ such that $s\leq t$ .
Here $s|T\in[0,1]^{n}$ is defined by $(S|\tau)_{i}=s$; if $i\in T$ and $(S|\tau)_{i}=0$ otherwise.
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Remark 2 Let $\xi_{u\tau}$ be a W-extension of $u_{T}$ . Note that $0\leq s\leq e^{\sup ps}$ for any $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ .
Therefore, if $T\not\subset supps$ , then
$0=\xi_{u\tau}(0)\leq\xi_{u\tau}(s)\leq\xi_{u\tau}(e^{\sup ps})=u_{T}(supps)=0$ .
Hence $\xi_{u\tau}(s)=0$ for $T\not\subset supps$ .




As a solution for a cooperative fuzzy game obtained as a U-extension from an ordinary
cooperative game, we consider a point-valued solution, which is a function $f$ : $[0,1]^{n}\cross$
$\Delta^{N}arrow R^{n}$ . If we assume linearity of $f$ with respect to $\xi$ , it is written as
$f_{j}(s, \xi_{v})=f_{i}(s,\xi_{\sum_{T\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)u_{T}})=f_{i}(s,\sum_{T\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)\xi_{u_{T}})=\sum_{T\subseteq N}d_{T}(v)f_{j}(s, \xi_{u_{T}})$
for each $v\in\Gamma^{N},$ $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ and $i\in N$ . Hence this value is specified by values of $f_{i}(s,\xi_{u\tau})$ .
When a fuzzy coalition $s$ is formed, the players participating in this coalition will share
the worth $\xi_{u\tau}(s)$ for the extension of the unanimity game $\xi_{u\tau}$ . We introduce a sharing
system $p=(p_{j}^{T})_{T\subseteq N,i\in T}$ satisfying $p_{i}^{T}\geq 0$ and $\sum_{i\in T}p_{i}^{T}=1$ . We put
$f_{i}^{p}(s,\xi_{u\tau})=\{$ $p_{j}^{T}\xi_{u\tau}(s)0,’ ifi\in Tifi\not\in T’$
Hence the value corresponding to the sharing system $p$ is given by
$f_{i}^{p}(s, \xi_{v})=\sum_{T\subseteq N,T\ni i}d_{T}(v)p_{j}^{T}\xi_{u_{T}}(s)$
for each $i\in N$ .
In particular, the case $p_{i}^{T}= \frac{1}{|T|}$ for all $i\in T$ corresponds to the Shapley value and the
obtained value is
$\phi_{i}(s, \xi_{v})=\sum_{T\subseteq N,T\ni i}\frac{d_{T}(v)}{|T|}\xi_{u\tau}(s)$ for each $i\in N$ .
When $\xi_{v}=l_{v}$ (Lov\’asz extension),
$\phi_{i}(s,l_{v})=\sum_{T\subseteq N,T\ni i}\frac{d_{T}(v)}{|T|}\min_{j\in T}s_{j}$ for each $i\in N$ .
It is clear that all these values are zero for $i\not\in supps$ .
The above Shapley value for the Lov\’asz extension was studied by Tsurumi et al. [12].
In Tsurumi et al. [12], though the explicit formula is slightly different, they proposed the
following Shapley value for $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ and $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ :
$g_{i}(s,l_{v})= \int_{0}^{1}\varphi_{i}([s]_{h}, v)dh,$ $i\in N$,
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$[s]_{h}=\{j\in N|s_{j}\geq h\},$ $h\in[0,1]$
$\varphi_{i}([s]_{h}, v)$ is the Shapley value of $i\in N$ for the subgame $v|[s]_{h}$ of $v$ on $[s]_{h}$ , i.e., in terms
of dividends
$\varphi_{i}([s]_{h}, v)=\sum_{T\subseteq[s]_{h},T\ni i}\frac{d_{T}(v)}{|T|}$ .
We should note that $T\subseteq[s]_{h}$ if and only if $s_{j}\geq h$ for all $j\in T$ , i.e., if and only if
$\min_{j\in T}s_{j}\geq h$ . Therefore we can prove that $g_{i}(s, l_{v})=\phi_{i}(s, l_{v})$ for any $i\in N$ .
The most fundamental set-valued solution for cooperative games is the core function
(Tsurumi, Tanino and Inuiguchi [11]) defined by
$C(s, \xi)=\{x\in R^{n}|\sum_{si\in\sup p}x_{i}=\xi(s),x_{i}=0, \forall i\not\in supps, i\in gupp\sum_{t}x_{i}\geq\xi(t), 0\leq\forall t\leq s\}$ .
Finally we discuss some properties of the solution $f^{p}(s, \xi_{v})$ . The first result is the
efficiency of this solution.
Proposition 9 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N_{J}}\xi_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be a U-extension of $v$ and $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ be a fuzzy
coalition. Then for any sharing system $p=(p_{i}^{T})_{T\subseteq N,i\in T}$ ,
$\sum_{i\in N}f_{1}^{p}(s, \xi_{v})=\xi_{v}(s)$ .
Proposition 10 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N},$ $\xi_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be a W-extension of $v$ and $s\in[0,1]^{n}$ be a fuzzy
coalition. Then for any sharing system $p=(p_{i}^{T})_{T\subseteq N,i\in T}$ ,
$f_{i}^{p}(s, \xi_{v})=\{\begin{array}{l}\Sigma d_{T}(v)p_{i}^{T}\xi_{u_{T}}(s)T\subseteq*upp\epsilon,T\ni i0\end{array}$
$i\in supps$ ,
$i\not\in supps$ .
Proposition 11 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ be a positive cooperative game, i. e., $d_{T}(v)\geq 0$ for all $T\subseteq N$ ,
$\xi_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be a W-extension of $v$ and $s,$ $t\in[0,1]^{n}$ be fuzzy coalitions such that $s\leq t$ . Then
for any sharing system $p=(p_{j}^{T})_{T\subseteq N,i\in T}$,
$f_{i}^{p}(s,\xi_{v})\leq f_{i}^{p}(t, \xi_{v})$ .
Theorem 9 Let $v\in\Gamma^{N}$ be a positive cooperative game, $\xi_{v}\in\Delta^{N}$ be a W-extension of $v$ ,
$s\in[0,1]^{n}$ be a fuzzy coalition and $p$ be a sharing system. Then
$f^{p}(s, \xi_{v})\in C(s,\xi_{v})$ .
6 Conclusion
We have dealt with classes of cooperative games which can be obtained as extensions of
ordinary cooperative games. Some of them can be dealt with in a unified manner through
the dividend representation. Typical classes are the multilinear extension and the Lov\’asz
extension. We studied several properties of those classes of games, for example, mono-
tonicity, superadditivity and convexity. Finally we have discussed solutions of cooperative
fuzzy games extended from ordinary cooperative games.
Because of page limitation, all the proofs of lemmas, propositions and theorems are
omitted. Some of them can be found in Tanino [10].
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